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Abstract— Granular reasoning proposed by Murai et al. is
a mechanism for reasoning using granular computing, and the
concept of “focus” has been proposed as a key concept of granular
reasoning. On the other hand, the authors have proposed another
concept of granularity, called “visibility”. In this paper, we try to
capture the concepts of visibility and focus as modalities of modal
logics by introducing Scott-Montague models that illustrate the
visibility and focus by modal operators, respectively.
I. INTRODUCTION
Granular computing based on rough set theory (Pawlak
[14], [15]) has been widely studied as a new paradigm of
computing (for example, see [7], [17]). In particular, Murai
et al. has proposed granular reasoning as a mechanism for
reasoning using granular computing [8], and developed a
framework of granular reasoning, called a zooming reasoning
system [9], [10], [11]. The key concept of the zooming
reasoning system is focus, which represents sentences we use
in some step of reasoning. The focus provides a three-valued
truth valuation that assigns the truth value “true” or “false”
to atomic sentences that appear in the focus, and assigns the
truth value “unknown” to other atomic sentences.
On the other hand, the authors have proposed another con-
cept of granularity, called visibility [5]. Visibility separates all
sentences into “visible” sentences, that is, sentences we con-
sider, and “invisible” sentences which are out of consideration.
The authors also have constructed four-valued truth valuations
based on visibility and focus, which illustrate the concepts of
“clearly visible”, “obscurely visible” and “invisible” [6].
In this paper, we try to capture the concepts of visibility and
focus as modalities. In particular, we produce Scott–Montague
models that illustrate some properties of visibility and focus,
and represent the concept “A sentence p is visible” and ”p is
clearly visible” as modal sentences Vp and Cp, respectively.
II. BACKGROUNDS
A. Scott – Montague Models for Modal Logics
Let P be a set of (at most countably infinite) atomic sen-
tences. We construct a language LML(P) for modal logic from
P using logical operators > (the truth constant), ? (the falsity
constant), : (negation), ^ (conjunction), _ (disjunction), !
(material implication), $ (equivalence) and two modal oper-
ators 2 (necessity) and 3 (possibility) by the following rules:
(1) p 2 P ) p 2 LML(P)?(2) p 2 LML(P) ) :p 2 LML(P)?
(3) p; q 2 LML(P) ) p^q; p_q; p! q; p$ q 2 LML(P)?(4)
p 2 LML(P) ) 2p;3p 2 LML(P). A sentence is called non-
modal if the sentence does not contain any modal operators.
We denote L(P) to mean the set of all non-modal sentences.
Scott-Montague models (or minimal models; see Chellas [1]
for details) are a generalization of well-known Kripke models,
and provide possible worlds semantics for modal logics. A
Scott-Montague model M is a triple
hW;N; vi;
where W is a non-empty set of possible worlds, N is a
function from W to 22W , and v is a valuation that assigns
either the truth value t (true) or f (false) to each atomic
sentence p 2 P at each world w 2W .
We denote j=Mw p to mean that the sentence p is true at
the possible world w in the model M. j=Mw is obtained by
extending the valuation v by the usual way. For any sentence
p 2 LML(P), we define the truth set of p in M as kpkM =©
w 2W j j=Mw p
ª
. The truth condition of modal sentences is
given by
j=Mw 2p def() kpkM 2 N(w): (1)
Various conditions of N are considered such that
(m) X \ Y 2 N(w) ) X 2 N(w) and Y 2 N(w),
(c) X;Y 2 N(w) ) X \ Y 2 N(w),
(n) W 2 N(w),
(d) X 2 N(w) ) Xc 62 N(w),
(t) X 2 N(w) ) w 2 X ,
(4) X 2 N(w) ) fx 2W j X 2 N(x)g 2 N(w),
(5) X 62 N(w) ) fx 2W j X 62 N(x)g 2 N(w).
The smallest classical modal logic E is proved to be both
sound and complete with respect to the class of all Scott -
Montague models, where E contains the schema Df3: 3p$
:2:p and the rule of inference
RE: from p$ q infer 2p$ 2q
with the rules and axiom schemata of propositional logic. Each
condition of N corresponds to axiom schema such that
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M. 2(p ^ q)! (2p ^2q),
C. (2p ^2q)! 2(p ^ q),
N. 2>,
D. 2p! 3p,
T. 2p! p,
4. 2p! 22p,
5. 3p! 23p.
B. Visibility and Focus: Two Concepts of Granular Reasoning
1) Granularized possible worlds based on visibility: Let
¡ be a set of non-modal sentences considered in the current
step of reasoning. Using ¡, we define the visibility relative
to ¡. Moreover, we redefine the the concept of the focus,
and proposed the focus relative to ¡. The definitions of the
visibility Vs(¡) and focus Fc(¡) relative to ¡ are as follows:
Vs(¡) def= P \ Sub(¡) = P¡; (2)
Fc(¡) def= fp 2 P j either ¡ ` p or ¡ ` :pg ; (3)
where Sub(¡) is the union of the sets of subsentences of each
sentence in ¡. Using a (given) valuation v, we construct the
agreement relation RVs(¡) based on the visibility Vs(¡) as
follows:
xRVs(¡)y
def() v(p; x) = v(p; y); 8p 2 Vs(¡): (4)
The agreement relation RVs(¡) induce the set of granularized
possible worlds ~W def= W=RVs(¡). We also construct a
truth valuation ~vVs(¡) for granularized possible worlds ~x
def=
[x]RVs(¡) 2 ~W . The valuation ~vVs(¡) becomes the following
three-valued one:
~vVs(¡) : P £ ~W ¡! 2ft;fg n fft; fgg: (5)
The three-valued valuation ~vVs(¡) is defined by:
~vVs(¡)(p; ~w)
def=
8<: ftg; if v(p; x) = t; 8x 2 ~w;ffg; if v(p; x) = f ; 8x 2 ~w;;; otherwise: (6)
Hereafter, we use the following notations: T def= ftg and
F def= ffg, respectively. Using ~vVs(¡), we define the visibility
of atomic sentences.
Definition 1: An atomic sentence p is visible at ~w if and
only if either ~vVs(¡)(p; ~w) = T or ~vVs(¡)(p; ~w) = F. On the
other hand, p is invisible at ~w if and only if ~vVs(¡)(p; ~w) = ;.
The three-valued valuation ~vVs(¡) is extended to any non-
modal sentences by truth assignments of connectives : (nega-
tion), ^ (conjunction), _ (disjunction) and ! (implication)
illustrated in Table I. We denote the extended three-valued
truth valuation by the same notation ~vVs(¡). Similar to the
case of atomic sentences, for any non-modal sentence p, we
call p is visible at ~w if and only if either ~vVs(¡)(p; ~w) = T
or ~vVs(¡)(p; ~w) = F. On the other hand, p is invisible at ~w
if and only if ~vVs(¡)(p; ~w) = ;. Hence, if both p and q are
visible, it is clear that :p, p ^ q, p _ q and p ! q are also
visible.
TABLE I
TRUTH ASSIGNMENTS OF THE THREE-VALUED VALUATION
Negation :p
p :p
; ;
F T
T F
Conjunction p ^ q
HHHp
q ; F T
; ; ; ;
F ; F F
T ; F T
Disjunction p _ q
HHHp
q ; F T
; ; ; ;
F ; F T
T ; T T
Implication p ! q
HHHp
q ; F T
; ; ; ;
F ; T T
T ; F T
2) Equivalence classes of granularized possible worlds
based on focus: Using the focus Fc(¡) relative to ¡, we con-
struct an agreement relation RFc(¡) on the set of granularized
possible worlds ~W . If Fc(¡) 6= ;, we define the agreement
relation RFc(¡) as follows:
~xRFc(¡)~y
def() ~vVs(¡)(p; ~x) = ~vVs(¡)(p; ~y); 8p 2 Fc(¡): (7)
The agreement relation RFc(¡) on ~W induce the quotient set of
granularized possible worlds cW def= ~W=RFc(¡). We treat each
equivalence class bw def= [ ~w]RFc(¡) as a unit of consideration
as if each bw were a “possible world”. On the other hand, if
Fc(¡) = ;, we can not construct the agreement relation. In
this case, we define cW def= f ~Wg.
We consider a valuation function bvFc(¡) for equivalence
classes of granularized possible worlds as the following four-
valued one: bvFc(¡) : P £cW ¡! 2fT;Fg: (8)
The valuation bvFc(¡) is defined by:
bvFc(¡)(p; bw) def=
8>>>><>>>>:
fTg; ~vVs(¡)(p; ~x) = T; 8~x 2 bw;
fFg; ~vVs(¡)(p; ~x) = F; 8~x 2 bw;
fT;Fg; 9~x; ~y 2 bw s.t. ~vVs(¡)(p; ~x) = T;
and ~vVs(¡)(p; ~y) = F;
;; otherwise:
(9)
Definition 2: An atomic sentence p is clearly visible (or
in focus) at bw if and only if either bvFc(¡)(p; bw) = fTg orbvFc(¡)(p; bw) = fFg. On the other hand, p is obscurely visible
at bw if and only if bvFc(¡)(p; bw) = fT;Fg. Moreover, p is
invisible at bw if and only if bvFc(¡)(p; bw) = ;.
From this definition, it is clear that, for all p 2 Fc(¡), p is
clearly visible at all bw 2 cW .
Similar to the case of the three-valued valuation ~vVs(¡),
The four-valued valuation bvFc(¡) is extended to any non-
modal sentences by truth assignments illustrated in Table II.
We denote the extended four-valued truth valuation by the
same notation bvFc(¡). Similar to the three-valued case, for any
clearly visible sentences p and q, it is clear that :p, p ^ q,
p_ q and p! q are also clearly visible. Thus, there is at least
one equivalence class bw 2 cW such that bvFc(¡)(p; bw) = fTg
for all p 2 ¡.
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TABLE II
TRUTH TABLES OF THE FOUR-VALUED VALUATION
Negation :p
p :p
; ;
fFg fTg
fTg fFg
fT;Fg fT;Fg
Disjunction p _ q
HHHp
q ; fFg fTg fT;Fg
; ; ; ; ;
fFg ; fFg fTg fT;Fg
fTg ; fTg fTg fTg
fT;Fg ; fT;Fg fTg fT;Fg
Conjunction p ^ q
HHHp
q ; fFg fTg fT;Fg
; ; ; ; ;
fFg ; fFg fFg fFg
fTg ; fFg fTg fT;Fg
fT;Fg ; fFg fT;Fg fT;Fg
Implication p ! q
HHHp
q ; fFg fTg fT;Fg
; ; ; ; ;
fFg ; fTg fTg fTg
fTg ; fFg fTg fT;Fg
fT;Fg ; fT;Fg fTg fT;Fg
Note that, however, not all two-valued tautologies are satis-
fied by ~vFc(¡). For example, for any invisible sentence p and
obscurely visible sentence q, exclusive middle is not satisfied:
~vFc(¡)(p_:p; bw) = ; and ~vFc(¡)(q_:q; bw) = fT;Fg for allbw 2 cW .
Example 1: Let P = fp; q; rg be a set of atomic sentences,
and W be a non-empty set that has the following eight possible
worlds:
w1 = fp; q; rg, w2 = fp; qg, w3 = fp; rg, w4 = fpg,
w5 = fq; rg, w6 = fqg, w7 = frg, w8 = ;.
We define the truth value of each atomic sentence p 2 P at
each world w 2 W by v(p; w) = t() p 2 w. By this truth
assignment, for example, all atomic sentences are true at w1.
On the other hand, all atomic sentences are false at w8.
Suppose we have the following set of non-modal sentences
considered in the current step of reasoning: ¡ = fq; p ! qg.
Hence, we have the visibility Vs(¡) and focus Fc(¡) relative
to ¡ as follows, respectively: Vs(¡) = fp; qg, Fc(¡) = fqg.
Constructing the agreement relation RVs(¡) by equation (4),
we have the following four granularized possible worlds:
~w1 = fw1; w2g, ~w3 = fw3; w4g,
~w5 = fw5; w6g, ~w7 = fw7; w8g.
Each atomic sentence has the following three-valued truth
value:
~vFc(¡)(p; ~w1) = T; ~vFc(¡)(q; ~w1) = T; ~vFc(¡)(r; ~w1) = ;;
~vFc(¡)(p; ~w3) = T; ~vFc(¡)(q; ~w3) = F; ~vFc(¡)(r; ~w3) = ;;
~vFc(¡)(p; ~w5) = F; ~vFc(¡)(q; ~w5) = T; ~vFc(¡)(r; ~w5) = ;;
~vFc(¡)(p; ~w7) = F; ~vFc(¡)(q; ~w7) = F; ~vFc(¡)(r; ~w7) = ;:
These truth values indicate that p and q are visible, while r is
invisible.
Next, we construct the agreement relation RFc(¡) on ~W ,
and get the following two equivalence classes:cw1 = f ~w1; ~w5g = ffw1; w2g; fw5; w6gg,cw3 = f ~w3; ~w7g = ffw3; w4g; fw7; w8gg.
By (9), each atomic sentence has the following four-valued
truth value:bvFc(¡)(p; bw1) = fT;Fg; bvFc(¡)(q; bw1) = fTg;bvFc(¡)(r; bw1) = ;:bvFc(¡)(p; bw3) = fT;Fg; bvFc(¡)(q; bw3) = fFg;bvFc(¡)(r; bw3) = ;:
This means that q is clearly visible,but p is obscurely visible.
Similar to the three-valued case, r is invisible. Four-valued
truth values of any non-modal sentences are calculated based
on Table II. For example, the truth value of p ! q is:bvFc(¡)(p ! q; bw1) = fTg and bvFc(¡)(p ! q; bw3) = fT;Fg.
Thus, all non-modal sentences in ¡ is true, that is, clearly
visible, at bw1.
III. GRANULAR REASONING AND SCOTT – MONTAGUE
MODELS
A. Visibility as Modality
In this subsection, we try to capture the concept of visibility
by modality based on Scott – Montague models. Suppose we
have a set of granularized possible worlds ~W based on the
visibility Vs(¡) relative to ¡, and a non-modal sentence p is
visible at ~w 2 ~W . Instead of the modal operator 2, we use
a modal operator V, and we read Vp as “p is visible”. We
intend to illustrate the visibility by some Scott – Montague
model M as follows: for each possible world x 2 ~w,
j=Mx Vp; if p is visible at ~w:
For illustrating the concept of visibility as modality, we use
the following simple function NVs(¡).
Definition 3: Let ~W = f ~w1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; ~wng be the set of gran-
ularized possible worlds based on the visibility Vs(¡). A
function NVs(¡) : W ! 22W is defined by
NVs(¡)(x)
def=
© S
A A µ ~W ª ; 8x 2W; (10)
where
S
A means the union of all granularized possible worlds
in A. If A = ;, we define SA def= ;.
This definition means that, for any x 2 W , each element
X 2 NVs(¡)(x) is constructed by union of some granular-
ized possible worlds. Each ~w 2 ~W is an equivalence class
[w]RVs(¡) µ W , thus the function NVs(¡) is well-defined.
NVs(¡) satisfies the following conditions.
Lemma 1: The constructed function NVs(¡) by (10) satisfies
the condition (c), (n), (4) and (5). Moreover, NVs(¡) satisfies
the following properties:
(v!) X 2 NVs(¡) , Xc 2 NVs(¡).
Next, using NVs(¡), we construct a Scott - Montague model
M = hW;NVs(¡); vi. Lemma 1 indicates that the model M
validates schemata C, N, 4 and 5. Moreover, the condition (v!)
corresponds the following schema:
V!. Vp$ V:p.
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The truth condition of modal sentences, (1), captures part
of the concept of visibility. The following lemma captures the
property that if both p and q are visible, then :p, p^ q, p_ q
and p! q are also visible.
Lemma 2: 1) If p 2 Vs(¡), then j=Mw Vp for all w 2W .
2) For any p 2 L(P) and all w 2 W , if j=Mw Vp, then
j=Mw V:p.
3) For any p; q 2 L(P) and all w 2 W , if both j=Mw Vp
and j=Mw Vq, then j=Mw V(p ^ q), j=Mw V(p _ q), and
j=Mw V(p! q), respectively.
Combining these lemmas, we have the following result.
Theorem 1: Let ¡ be a non-empty set of non-modal sen-
tences, ~W be the set of granularized possible worlds based on
the visibility Vs(¡), and M = hW;NVs(¡); vi be a Scott-
Montague model that has a function NVs(¡) by Definition
3. For any non-modal sentence p 2 L(P), if p is visible at
~w 2 ~W , then j=Mx Vp for all x 2 ~w.
However, the converse of Theorem 1 is not satisfied. This
is because, in our formulation, any “invisible” tautology p
becomes j=Mw Vp. For example, suppose that an atomic sen-
tence r is invisible by ~vVs(¡). A tautology r _ :r is also
invisible by the definition of visibility. However, the truth set
kr _ :rkM = W is an element of NVs(¡)(w) for all w 2W ,
therefore j=Mw V(r _ :r). Unfortunately, we can not avoid
this difficulty. This is because it causes that the schema N
is satisfied using NVs(¡). Therefore we need to restrict our
formulation to satisfiable sentences.
Example 2: We use the same setting of Example 1. Using
~W = f ~w1; ~w3; ~w5; ~w7g, we construct a Scott - Montague
model M = hW;NVs(¡); vi by Definition 3, where W and
v are the same ones defined in Example 1.
We have Vs(¡) = fp; qg, thus atomic sentences p and q are
visible but r is invisible. For these atomic sentences, we have
the following truth sets, respectively:
kpkM = fw1; w2; w3; w4g;
kqkM = fw1; w2; w5; w6g;
krkM = fw1; w3; w5; w7g:
Here, it holds that kpkM = fw1; w2g [ fw3; w4g = ~w1 [ ~w3
and kqkM = fw1; w2g [ fw5; w6g = ~w1 [ ~w5. Therefore,
for example, j=Mx Vp and j=Mx Vq for all x 2 ~w1 by the
truth condition (1), respectively. On the other hand, we can
not construct krkM by union of ~wi, we have 6j=Mw Vr for all
w 2W .
B. Focus as Modality
Similar to the case of visibility, we try to capture the concept
of focus by modality based on Scott - Montague models. The
focus Fc(¡) relative to ¡ divides all “visible ”sentences into
“clearly visible” ones and “obscurely visible” ones. For any
clearly visible sentence p, using a modal operator C, we denote
Cp to mean that “p is clearly visible”. We intend to illustrate
the focus by some Scott - Montague model M as follows: LetcW be the quotient set of granularized possible worlds based
on the focus Fc(¡), and bw 2 cW be an equivalence class of
granularized possible worlds. For each possible world y 2 ~x
such that ~x 2 bw,
j=My Cp; if p is clearly visible at bw:
To construct a function NFc(¡) that illustrates the concept
of focus as modality, we take the following two steps:
1) Constructing a function N bwFc(¡) for each bw 2 cW .
2) Combining all N bwFc(¡).
First, we define the function N bwFc(¡).
Definition 4: For each bw 2 cW , a function N bwFc(¡) : S bw !
22
W is defined by:
N bwFc(¡)(x) def= © SA A µ U( bw) ª ; 8x 2[ bw; (11)
where U( bw) = ³ ~W n bw´ [ (S bw). If A = ;, then SA def= ;.
Next, combining all functions N bwFc(¡), we define the func-
tion NFc(¡).
Definition 5: For all x 2W , a function NFc(¡) : W ! 22W
is defined by:
NFc(¡)(x)
def=
8>><>>:
N bwFc(¡)(x); if Fc(¡) 6= ;;and x 2 [ bw
fW; ;g; otherwise.
(12)
It is easy to check that the function NFc(¡) is well-defined
by Definition 5. The key of this construction is the set U( bw),
which provides “units” of construction at each possible world
x 2 bw. U( bw) does not contain any granularized possible
worlds ~y in bw. This is because we need to capture the property
that an atomic sentence p is visible if and only if p is true at all
granularized possible worlds in bw or false at all granularized
possible worlds in bw. Hence, if some ~y 2 bw are contained in
U( bw), some atomic sentence q 2 Vs(¡) nFc(¡) may become
“clearly visible”. Thus, any ~y 2 bw should not be included in
U( bw).
The differences between NVs(¡) and NFc(¡) are the fol-
lowing: (1) NVs(¡) treats all combinations of unions of gran-
ularized possible worlds as “unit” of consideration, while
NFc(¡) treats some restricted parts of combinations of unions
of granularized possible worlds. This is because we need to
distinguish “ clearly visible” sentences and “obscurely visible”
sentences by using the fucntion NFc(¡), and the concept “p is
clearly visible” (or “in focus”) requires that p is either T or
F at all granularized possible worlds in bw. (2) NFc(¡) needs
to treat the case Fc(¡) = ;. In the case of NVs(¡), by the
definition of Vs(¡) we need not to consider the case that
Vs(¡) =. However, in NFc(¡), we have to consider Fc(¡) = ;,
that is, the case that “nothing is clear”.
NFc(¡) satisfies the following conditions.
Lemma 3: The constructed function NFc(¡) by (12) satisfies
the condition (c), (n) and (v!).
However, in general, the conditions (4) and (5) are not
satisfied.
Next, using NFc(¡), we construct a Scott - Montague model
M = hW;NFc(¡); vi. Lemma 4 indicates that the model M
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validates schemata C, N and V!. Moreover, all properties
illustrated in Lemma 2 are also valid for the operator C, that
is, if both p and q are clearly visible, then :p, p ^ q, p _ q
and p! q are also clearly visible.
Lemma 4: 1) If p 2 Vs(¡), then j=Mw Cp for all w 2W .
2) For any p 2 L(P) and all w 2 W , if j=Mw Cp, then
j=Mw C:p.
3) For any p; q 2 L(P) and all w 2 W , if both j=Mw Cp
and j=Mw Cq, then j=Mw C(p ^ q), j=Mw C(p _ q), and
j=Mw C(p! q), respectively.
Thus, we have the following result.
Theorem 2: Let ¡ be a non-empty set of non-modal sen-
tences, cW be the set of equivalence classes of granularized
possible worlds based on Fc(¡), and M = hW;NFc(¡); vi
be a Scott-Montague model that has a function NFc(¡) by
Definition 5. For any non-modal sentence p, if p is clearly
visible at bw 2 cW , then j=Mx Cp for all x 2 ~y such that ~y 2 bw.
However, by the same reason of the case of Vp, the converse
of Theorem 2 is not satisfied.
Example 3: We use the same setting of Example 1. Usingcw1 = f ~w1; ~w5g = ffw1; w2g; fw5; w6gg, cw3 = f ~w3; ~w7g =
ffw3; w4g; fw7; w8gg, we get the sets U( bw1) and U( bw3) as
follows:
U( bw1) def= ffw1; w2; w5; w6g; fw3; w4g; fw7; w8gg;
U( bw3) def= ffw3; w4; w7; w8g; fw1; w2g; fw5; w6gg:
Thus, using U( bw1) and U( bw3), we construct functions
N bw1Fc(¡) and N bw3Fc(¡) by Definition 4, and a Scott - Montague
model M = hW;NFc(¡); vi with the function NFc(¡) by
Definition 5.
We have Vs(¡) = fp; qg and Fc(¡) = fqg, thus q is clearly
visible but p is obscurely visible. Here, by the model M,
it holds that kqkM = fw1; w2; w5; w6g 2 NFc(¡)(x) for all
x 2 W . Therefore, for example, j=Mw2 Cq and j=Mw2 C:q. On
the other hand, we can not construct kpkM at either bw1 orbw3, therefore we have 6j=Mwi Cp and 6j=Mwi C:p at any wi 2W .
We can also treat complex non-modal sentences. For exam-
ple, in Example 1, p! q is clearly visible at bw, but obscurely
visible at bw3. Here, kp! qkM = fw1; w2; w3; w4; w5; w6g =
fw1; w2; w5; w6g[fw3; w4g 2 NFc(¡)(wi) for all wi 2
S bw1.
Thus, for example, we have j=Mw6 C(p ! q). On the other
hand, we can not construct kp ! qkM at bw3, therefore
6j=Mwi C(p! q) at any wi 2
S bw3.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we tried to capture the concepts of visibility
and focus as modalities. First, we proposed a modal operator
V that means “visible”, and constructed the function NVs(¡) to
illustrate some properties of visibility. Moreover, we proposed
a Scott–Montague models M such that if p is visible at ~w,
then j=Mx Vp at all x 2 ~w. Next, we proposed another
modal operator C that means ”clearly visible”, and constructed
the function NFc(¡). Moreover, we proposed another Scott–
Montague models M such that if p is clearly visible at bw,
then j=Mx Cp at all x 2
S
~w.
There are many future issues. First, we need to explore con-
nections between V and C by multi modal Scott – Montague
models and axiomatic characterization of visibility and focus.
Combination with other modal logics, in particular, logics
of knowledge and belief (for example, see [3]), and logics
of time (for example, see [16]) are also interest. Moreover,
we need to consider relationship among our framework and
zooming reasoning systems [9], [10], [11] and belief change
(for example, see [2], [4]).
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